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THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD REGULATIONS
OF COMMON TRUST FUNDS
C. AL xANqDE.I CAl ON*
An understanding of the regulations issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, concerning the collective investment of trust funds, may be
aided by a consideration of some of the problems which are inherent in the use of
such funds. Before considering that subject, however, it may be appropriate to men-
tion the occasion for the issuance of such regulations.
Several years ago a few trust companies in various parts of the country set up
common trust funds, through which the moneys of various separate trusts might be
collectively invested. In each instance the authority to so invest such funds was
found only in the instruments creating such trusts. In the absence of express author-
ity to mingle, for the purposes of investment, the funds of a particular trust with
those of others, it was recognized that no such collective investment was proper.
At the time or shortly after the first of these funds were established, the question
was submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue as to whether such a common trust
fund was taxable as an association, i.e., whether it would be subjected to corporate
taxes. The Bureau ruled that certain of such common trust funds should not be
subjected to such corporate taxes. Subsequently, however, the taxation of various
types of associations and investment trusts was the subject of litigation and, after the
courts had ruled that numerous of such associations and trusts were subject to cor-
porate taxes, the Internal Revenue Bureau was impelled to modify its earlier rulings,
and asserted that all such common trust funds should be taxed as corporations.
It was generally recognized by the trust companies that the burden of such cor-
porate taxes was sufficiently heavy to render undesirable the expansion of their pro-
gram for the collective investment of trust funds. However, many felt that the idea
was inherently sound and that their use should not be discouraged by the imposition
of such taxes. The.problem was presented to the Treasury Department, which was
sympathetic to the point of view that relief should be afforded to permit the use of
these funds, and did not oppose the adoption of legislation to overcome the difficulty.
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It was felt necessary to carefully restrict the scope of such legislation so that it might
not be used as a cloak for other aggregations of capital. Accordingly, Section i69
of the Revenue Act of 1936 was adopted. ' This provides in effect that a common
trust fund shall not be considered a corporation or subjected to corporate taxes, that
the income of the common trust fund shall be computed as if it were an individual,
and that each participating trust shall include, in computing its net income, its
proportionate share, whether or not distributed, of the net income of the common
trust fund.
To restrict the application of this provision, the term "common trust fund" was
defined as a "fund maintained by a bank ... (x) exclusively for the collective in-
vestment and reinvestment of moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity
as a trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian, and (2) in conformity with rules
and regulations, prevailing from time to time, of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System pertaining to the collective investment of trust funds by
national banks." This in effect required the formulation of such rules and regula-
tions by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Shortly after the enactment of this statute, a committee of the American Bankers
Association was appointed to study this subject and to lend any assistance that might
be possible to the Federal Reserve Board. This committee promptly went to work.
On numerous occasions it conferred with members of the board and the technical
staff, and collected much data on the experience of those funds which had been
previously established in this country and the much longer experience of such funds
in other countries where they have been extensively used for many years. This data
was laid before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with numer-
ous suggestions concerning the scope of the regulations and the means which might
be employed to prevent abuses arising from the use of such common trust funds.
After very carefil study, the Board issued its regulations to become effective Decem-
ber 31, .1937. Such regulations constitute Section 17 of Regulation F. Unless other-
wise indicated, subsequent references are to subdivisions of that section.
One of the fundamental questions which the establishment and continued use of
such common trust funds presents is this. How may equality among the participat-
ing trusts constantly -be maintained? No difficulty would be presented if all the
participating trusts should enter and withdraw at the same time, but this is not con-
templated. It is proposed that such funds shall be continuous, permitting additions
whenever funds are available for investment, and withdrawal when a participating
trust terminates or for some other reason has need of some of the moneys invested in
the common trust. Furthermore, it is not contemplated that such funds should
consist solely of short term mortgage investments which might be deemed to have
a constant market value. The investments of such a common trust should -embrace
a broad list of securities. The possibility of wide diversification of a large fund is
one of the chief advantages of the common trust fund. It must therefore be recog-
149 STAT. 1708, 26 U. S. C. A. §z69 (Supp. 1936).
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nized that the market value of many of the investments of the common trust will
fluctuate from time to time. After the fund is once established, when a new trust
enters or one of the participating trusts withdraws, the bank managing the common
trust fund will occupy the position of buyer as well as seller. As trustee of the trusts
already interested in the common fund it will be desirous of obtaining as large a
sum as possible for a new participating interest, and as trustee of the trust then
acquiring a participation, it will be its duty to pay no more than the fair value of
such participation. It is essential, therefore, that rules shall be established for the
determination, from time to time, of the fair market value of the whole fund and of
the participating interests. It is also of great importance to the banks administering
such funds that the determination of the value in good faith, pursuant to the rules
so established, shall be conclusive, and not subject to review. They must be protected
in any action taken by them in reliance on the value so determined.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System recognized this problem,
but wisely refrained from any attempt to prescribe the precise method of valuing
thi fund. Instead, its regulations require that a common trust fund shall be operated
under a written plan to be approved by a resolution of the board of directors of the
bank administering the fund, and that such plan shall contain full and detailed
provisions with respect to the basis and method of valuing assets in the common
trust fund. Thus, varying methods of valuation may be adopted to meet. the condi-
tions prevailing in different places and in connection with different funds.
As illustrative of proper provisions for the valuation of such funds, the regula-
tions issued by the New York State Banking Board may be of interest. The New
York Banking Law, Section Io-c(ii), authorizes the Banking Board of that state to
regulate the conduct and management of common trust funds established pursuant
to Section ioo-c of such Banking Law. Specific authorization is granted to the
Banking Board "after determining the methods and standards by which the fair
value of such common trust funds and of the assets and investments thereof may be
determined ... to make.., rules and regulations prescribing the methods and
standards to be employed by any corporation maintaining such a common trust
fund in determining the value thereof and of the assets and investments therein and
in establishing the reserves or credits respectively to be deducted from or added to
such fund in so determining its value."
Pursuant to this authorization, the New York State Banking Board has issued
regulations which prescribe the following method to be used in the valuation of
investments:
a. Where there have been recorded sales or bid and asked prices on a security exchange
in the city of New York, within ten business days next preceding the valuation date, the
trust investment committee shall use for the valuation of each investment of the common
trust fund the last recorded sales price, unless subsequent to such sale there shall have
been recorded bid and asked prices, in which event the mean of the most recent of such
bid and asked prices shall be used. For the purposes of this paragraph recorded sales and
bid and asked prices shall be those appearing in newspapers of general circulation pub-
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lished in the city of New York; in standard financial periodicals; or on the records of such
security exchanges.
b. In all other cases the trust investment committee shall obtain from three bankers or
brokers qualified to give an opinion as to value of the investment in question a written
estimate of the value of such investment as of the dose of the last business day prior to the
valuation date. The average of such estimates shall be used, and each such estimate shall
be retained in the records of the common trust fund.
c. An investment purchased and awaiting payment against delivery shall be included
for valuation purposes as a security held, and the cash account shall be adjusted to reflect
the purchase price.
d. An investment sold but not delivered pending receipt of proceeds shall be valued
at the net sales price.
e. For the purpose of valuation of an investment, except an investment sold but not
delivered, it shall be unnecessary to deduct from the value ascertained as above indicated
brokers' commissions or other expenses which would be incurred upon a sale !hereof.
The federal regulations are explicit in providing that funds may be admitted and
withdrawn only on the basis of the valuation of the assets of the common trust fund
by the trust investment committee of the administering bank, and only on the date
the value is so determined, "or if permitted by the plan, within two business days
subsequent to the date of such determination." To insure the fact that funds may be
withdrawn within a reasonable time after they are needed, the regulations further
require that such valuation shall be made at least every three months.
2
As previously mentioned, the prevailing thought is that additions to and with-
drawals from a common trust fund should be permitted. If the establishment of such
funds is to present the advantages which are claimed by the advocates of such a sys-
tem, this is of great importance. The ability promptly to invest comparatively small
sums received by a trustee is obviously of importance. Of equal, if not greater im-
portance, is the ability to realize cash through the withdrawal of moneys invested in
the common trust fund. The necessity for cash to satisfy annuities or other charges
against the principal of a fund, or to distribute the principal upon the termination of
the period for which the trust is established is obvious. If provision were not made
to permit the prompt withdrawal of funds, it would hardly be prudent for a trustee
to enter such a common trust fund. It seems, therefore, that it may be assumed that
it is essential to any plan for the establishment of a common trust fund that such
provision be made.
It is not sufficient merely to provide machinery to determine the value of the
fund and of participations therein. If funds are to be withdrawn, the common trust
fund must be so constituted that cash may be realized when a call for such with-
drawal is made. This requires some degree of liquidity. Thus the federal regula-
tions provide: "Any bank administering a common trust fund shall have the re-
sponsibility of maintaining in cash and readily marketable securities such part of
the assets of the common trust fund as shall be deemed by the bank to be necessary
2Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F ("Trust Powers of National Banks"), §17(c)(4).
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to provide adequately for the needs of participating trusts and to prevent inequities
between such trusts.""
This suggests the question as to how inequities between participating trusts might
arise, if no participating trust may withdraw more than its share of the value of the
whole fund. An example will quickly illustrate how this might occur. Suppose one
trust holds a ten per cent participating interest and ninety per cent of the common
trust fund is invested in bonds and mortgages or other assets which may not readily
be liquidated. If such participating trust should withdraw its entire interest in the
common trust fund, no other trust would be able to withdraw any moneys, no
matter how great its need might be. Again suppose that, in a declining market, a
large number of participating trusts should withdraw, the tendency of the bank
administering the fund might be to sell the best securities as the easiest way of rais-
ing the necessary funds. The remaining participating trusts might find their interest
frozen in weak or unliquid investments. Obviously the best protection against such
untoward results is wise and prudent management. However, the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System has erected safeguards to protect all participating
trusts against either thoughtless or wilful neglect of this primary obligation to
preserve equality in the treatment of all such trusts.
First, the written plan under which the common trust fund is operated must set
forth the investment powers.4
Second, before any distribution in cash is made, the trust investment committee
of the administering bank must determine whether any investment remaining in the
fund would be unlawful for one or more participating trusts, if funds of such trust
were being invested at that time. If there be any such investment, it must be
eliminated from the fund before any disitribution in cash is made. Such elimination
may be made either through a sale thereof, through distribution in kind, or through
segregation.m5
When an investment is segregated, it must be administered or realized upon for
the benefit ratably of all trusts participating in the common trust fund at the time of
such segregation. Such segregation is treated as a withdrawal of such investment
from the common trust fund, although it must, for tax purposes, still be deemed to
be part of the common fund.'
The effect of these provisions is to permit a trust to withdraw its share of the
value of investments which are still sound and eligible, but to prevent any participat-
ing trust from taking from the remaining trusts any part of the good assets in pay-
ment of its share of the supposed value of any investment which has become
ineligible.
Third, it is not sufficient that the remaining investments should be eligible. It is
only proper that a fair ratio of liquidity of thefund be preserved and that this should
not be destroyed by withdrawals. Thus it is provided that no distribution, other
'Id. 517()(I).
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than a ratable distribution upon all participations, is permitted at any time, if after
all withdrawals and additions made at such time, the cash and readily marketable
securities are less than forty per cent of the remaining assets.7
The Board has not only placed restrictions on the withdrawal of funds but has
also thrown safeguards around the investment of any new funds in a common trust
fund. First, no funds of a trust may be invested in a participation without the ap-
proval of the trust investment committee of the bank. Second, before permitting any
funds to be so invested, such committee must review the investments and if it finds
that any such investment is one in which the funds of such trust might not be law-
fully invested at that time, the funds of such trust may not be invested in such a par-
ticipation.8 Third, no admission of funds to a common trust fund is permitted at
any time, if after all admissions and withdrawals to be made at such time, the ratio
of cash and readily marketable securities would be less than forty per cent of the
remaining assets.9
It will be seen that if a common trust fund is to be continued as an active fund,
to which funds may be added or from which they may be withdrawn, it is necessary
for the bank administering it to see that the fund embraces only eligible investments,
and that a large proportion of these are readily marketable. As soon as an invest-
ment ceases to be eligible, it must be sold, or, if a sale is not possible or desirable, it
must be segregated and held for the trusts then interested in the common trust fund.
The provision for segregation of investments ceasing to be eligible is very prac-
tical and useful. A trustee administering such a fund may be loathe to sell such an
investment because of its belief that it is sound and that the investors will lose
nothing if they have patience, but such patience should be exercised only in behalf
of those who are then interested. New trusts should not be permitted to assume
the risks which usually are inherent when an investment ceases to be eligible, nor
should those presently interested in such an investment be permitted to withdraw
their shire until the investment has been liquidated.
Again, it may be impossible to liquidate immediately such an investment. A
bond and mortgage may become ineligible because the value of the mortgaged
property may depreciate after the money is loaned, but such investment may not be
liquidated until and unless there is a default on the part of the mortgagor.
The Federal Reserve Board is to be congratulated on these provisions which
should insure that common trust funds governed by such regulations will at all times
be made up of good investments described in the plan for such funds, and that such
funds will not become clogged with undesirable investments.
No attempt has been made by the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe the invest-
ments which may be made by banks administering such common trust funds. This
policy of the Board is also to be commended. Flexibility to meet varying purposes
and conditions is thus permitted. For example, New York has enActed legislation
to permit trust companies and banks in that state to invest the funds of estates, trusts,
'Id. 517(c)(2). "Id- §17(c)(5) (last par.).1 Id. 5 17(W (5) (last par.).
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and guardianships, in a common trust fund established pursuant to such statute and
the rules and regulations of the Banking Board of that state.10 That statute greatly
limits the investments which may be made for such a fund. This, however, does not
prevent a New York trust company from establishing another common trust fund
with more liberal investment powers for the use of those testators and settlors who
believe that greater advantages may be obtained if greater latitude of investments be
granted to the trustee.
The proponents of the common trust fund have consistently urged that one of
the strongest factors of safety in any investment program is broad diversification.
They assert that only through a common fund can small trusts acquire such diversifi-
cation. In line with this idea, the Federal Reserve Board has embodied in its regula-
tions the following provisions to require diversification: "No investment for a com-
mon trust fund shall be made in the stocks, or bonds or other obligations of any one
person, firm, or corporation, which would cause the total amount of investment in
the stocks, or bonds or other obligations issued or guaranteed by such person, firm, or
corporation to exceed ten per cent of the value of the common trust fund, as de-
termined by the trust investment committee, provided that this limitation shall not
apply to investments in obligations of the United States or for the payment of the
principal and interest of which the faith and credit of the United States shall be
pledged.""
A further regulation restricting investments which may be made for a common
trust fund embodies another thought, that is, that a bank operating a common trust
fund should not invest such a portion of the fund as to acquire a controlling interest
therein. Apparently it was the view of the Federal Reserve Board that a more de-
tached judgment as to the worth of an investment may be expected from one who is
not in control of the management of a corporation issuing such investment; also that
difficulties may be encountered in selling a large proportion of any outstanding issue.
Possibly, also, the Board may have entertained the view that it is socially undesirable
that common trust funds should b'e used by banks to obtain control of corporations.
Whatever the motive may have been, we find this provision:
No investment for a common trust fund shall be made in any one class of shares of
stock of any one corporation which would cause the total number of such shares held by
the common trust fund to exceed five per cent of the number of such shares outstanding.
If the bank administers more than one common trust fund, no investment shall be made
which would cause the aggregate investment for all such common trust funds in shares of
stock of any one corporation to exceed such limitation.' 2
Another subject which was a matter of very earnest consideration on the part of
the Federal Reserve Board was the possibility of such a common trust fund being
used merely as a means of investment, and possibly of speculation, by persons other
than the bank acting in a fiduciary capacity. The Board recognized that by the
IDN. Y. BA=NG LAW, §xOO-C.
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enactment of Section 169 of the Revenue Act of 1936, Congress did not intend to
confer tax exemption upon investment trusts in general, but only on an investment
trust used exclusively by a bank for the investment of trust funds held by such bank.
Thus it stated: "The purpose of this section 13 is to permit the use of common
trust funds, as defined in section 169 of the Revenue Act of 1936, for the investment
of funds held for true fiduciary purposes; and the operation of such common trust
funds as investment trusts for other than strictly fiduciary purposes is hereby
prohibited.' 4
This subject gave rise to very considerable discussion as to whether revocable
trusts should not be excluded. It was suggested by some that if the funds of such
trusts might be invested in. a common trust fund, a person desiring to invest in the
common trust fund might do so by establishing a revocable trust with the bank
administering such fund, and direct that the funds be invested in the common trust
fund, and that the settlor of such a trust might require the withdrawal of such funds
by revoking the trust and demanding the repayment of the trust fund to himself.
On the other hand it was pointed out that bona fide trusts are often established
to confer a benefit upon one or more persons who are not trained in the management
of investments, where the settlor desires to retain a power of termination or revoca-
tion during his lifetime, so that if the management of the trust fund is not satisfac-
tory or conditions change which make it undesirable that the trust should be con-
tinued, he may still have control of the situation by revocation of the trust.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System finally concluded that
the mere possibility of a common trust fund being used by others for investment
purposes was not sufficient to warrant the exclusion of all revocable trusts from the
benefits which it was hoped might be derived through the use of common trust
funds. The Board recognized that it was impossible in advance to lay down any
fixed rules upon this subject, and therefore place responsibility for the admission or
exclusion of such funds upon the trust investment committee of the bank operating
the fund. The regulation provides: "The trust 'investment committee of a bank
operating a common trust fund shall not permit any funds of any trust to be invested
in a common trust fund if it has reason to believe that such trust was not created or
is not being used for bona fide fiduciary purposes."'
To further discourage the use of such funds merely as a medium for investment
by persons other than the bank in its fiduciary capacity, the *Board further provided:
"No bank administering a common trust fund' shall issue any document evidencing
a direct or indirect interest in such common trust fund in any form which purports
to be negotiable or assignable."1 It is understood, however, that this provision was
not intended to exclude the right of a bank to issue a certificate of participation in
an investment which has been segregated and placed in a liquidation account. The
issuance of such certificates may be necessary to enable a bank to effect distribution
"'Id. 517.
3" Ibid.
'Id. 517(a).
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of the principal of a participating trust. While the Board has not officially ruled
upon this, it is understood that it would not object to such a certificate being made
assignable.
In line with this same thought, that no person should be permitted to speculate
through a common trust fund, not even the bank itself, we find a requirement that
notice of an intention to participate or withdraw funds from the common trust be
given prior to the date of valuation as of which such participation or withdrawal is
effected. The regulations indicate that the plan must provide what the length of
notice shall be. Notice must be given in writing to the bank or a written notation
of the contemplated participation or withdrawal must be made in the records of the
bank.17 Since the price for which investments in the common trust will sell in the
future on any particular day cannot be known, this requirement of prior notice should
prevent any attempt to profit by seeking to gain admission or withdrawal of funds
because of the condition of the market on any valuation due. The New York statute
requires five days notice.' s This provision for notice may also be regarded as one of
those provisions through which the Federal Reserve Board has sought to require
equality of treatment for all participating trusts.
Another question closely related to the foregoing was the fear. that common trust
funds might at some time be embarrassed by something akin to a run, the thought
being that if lack of confidence in prevailing conditions should arise, numerous per-
sons having interests in participating trusts might demand the withdrawal of such
participations from a common trust fund. It was thought that, if many of such
withdrawals should be made at the same time, this might have an injurious effect
upon the remaining participants. It was suggested that this possibility might be a
real danger if revocable trusts were permitted to invest in a common trust fund. It
was pointed out, however, that the banks and trust companies, which had established
common trust funds prior to the 1929 depression and had admitted revocable trusts,
had experienced no such runs. It therefore seemed that there was no basis for such
fears.
However, it was agreed by all that the withdrawal of too large a proportion of
a common trust fund at any time might lead to some embarrassment, and that it
was desirable that some limitation should be.placed upon the proportion of a com-
mon trust fund which might be owned by any one trust. Accordingly, the Federal
Reserve Board provided that no funds of any trust should be invested in a participa-
tion in a common trust fund, if such investment would result in such trust having
an interest therein in excess of ten per cent of the value of the common trust fund.' 9
The federal regulations place a further limitation on the amount of any trust
which may be invested in a common trust fund. No more than $25,000 of any trust
may be so invested. Whether any such limitation should be included in the regula-
tions was a subject of much debate, at least among the members of the committee of
L Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F, S17(c)(5).'N. Y. BANKING LAW, 5xoo-¢(6).
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the American Bankers Association. It was thought by some that if the use of a
common trust fund for investment purposes was good for a small trust, it was
equally desirable for a larger one.
Upon learning that the Federal Reserve Board's technical staff entertained a
definite view that some such limitation should be included, the committee discussed
the foll6wing question: How small a sum may properly be invested and reasonable
diversification be obtained? Inquiries upon this subject were addressed to bankers in
many parts of the country. The committee was of the view that the common trust
fund should be available to any trust which is not sufficient in amount to provide
such reasonable diversification in its investments. The replies varied greatly as to
the amount required, ranging from $Io,ooo to $ioo,ooo. What is regarded as a large
trust in one section of the country is regarded as meager in the more populous
centers.
The result of these inquiries was submitted to the Federal Reserve Board, and
the committee expressed the view that if any such limitation were placed on the
amount which might be invested by a trust, it should be not less than $5oooo. Before
the Board acted upon this matter, however, legislation was enacted in New York
which placed a limit of $25,000 on the amount which might be so invested. Un-
doubtedly this influenced the Federal Reserve Board in its determination to include
a similar limitation in its regulations.
While the wisdom of this is doubted by some, recognition must be given to the
fact that in the experimental stages of these common trust funds in this country, it
is not unreasonable to carefully restrict their use. If they prove as successful as their
advocates hope, it should not be difficult to have this regulation modified.
It may be well to note that the regulation limiting the amount which may be
invested by a particular trust, must be read carefully. No difficulty is encountered
if the funds of any trust are invested in a common trust fund at one time. However,
if this be not the case, then the regulation would seem to require that before further
funds of the trust are added to the common trust fund, the value of the participation
previously acquired for that trust be determined and that only the difference be-
tw'een that value and $25,oo may be so invested for that trust.
The regulations are emphatic in providing that a bank administering a common
trust fund shall not invest any of its own funds therein; further, that if the bank,
because of a creditor relationship, acquires any interest in a participation therein,
such participation shall be withdrawn on the first date upon which such withdrawal
may be affected. 20 Nor may the bank have any interest in the assets held in the
common trust fund.21 Apparently the Board felt that it was of importance that no
self-interest should be permitted to influence the bank in its administration of such
fund, and that there must be no dealing between the bank in its own right and the
common trust fund.
While the Board has not yet officially ruled upon the subject, it is understood that
nld. §17(a)(3).'Id. S170a)(2).
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it was not its intention to prohibit a bank from making a temporary advance of its
own funds to a trust holding a participation in a. common trust fund. If this be so,
such advances as are often made, to supply a trust with moneys to pay expenses or
other charges, or to enable the trtist to make a payment to an income beneficiary
on account of accrued but uncollected income, will still be possible. It is also under-
stood that ihe Board would not deem it in contravention of this regulation for a bank
to loan or advance its own funds against the security of an investment segregated
and placed in a liquidation account. This is of importance, for it is likely that it
may be necessary that funds be available to protect an investment so segregated. A
typical instance would be a bond and mortgage in default. Such a bond and mort-
gage should be segregated. Funds will be required to pay the expenses of foreclosure,
and if the mortgaged property be bought in by the trustee, to provide for rehabilita-
tion of such property. If the necessary funds could not be advanced by the bank,
injury might result.
The management of a common trust fund must be exclusively in the bank ad-
ministering such fund. The regulations wisely provide for this.22 Thus, if a trust
which owns a participation in such a common trust fund terminates and the principal
vests in the remaindermen, such remaindermen may not interfere with the manage-
ment of the fund by the bank. Moreover, it is understood that the Federal Reserve
Board regards it as appropriate for a bank, when acting as one of two or more
co-trustees of a particular trust, and when so authorized by the trust instrument or
local law governing such trust, to invest such trust funds in a common trust fund.
Notwithstanding the fact that there may be one or more co-trustees of a participating
trust, the common trust must be managed exclusively by the bank. In view of the
phraseology of Section 169 of the Revenue Act of 1936, it would probably be well
for banks establishing such common trust funds, to limit investments therein to
trusts of which they are the sole trustee, until the Bureau of Internal Revenue has
recognized the propriety of so investing funds of which the bank is only one of two
or more trustees.
The federal regulations also provide that a bank establishing such a common trust
fund shall make no extra charge for administering it; i.e., the bank must look to the
participating trusts for compensation. It is assumed that the bank will receive the
same commissions or other compensation from the participating trusts as if they
were separately invested. Nor may the bank pay from the common trust funds any
fee, commission or compensation for the management thereof, but may pay such
reasonable expenses incurred in its administration as would have been chargeable to
the participating trusts if incurred in their separate administration. 28
Other important provisions of the regulations are those relating to the auditing
and settlement of accounts of a bank with respect to a common trust fund. Such
accounts must be audited annually by auditors responsible only to the board of direc-
tors of the bank, and a report of the audit must be sent to each person to whom an
'1d. §17(C)(8). '7d. §17(c)(8).
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accounting of the participating trusts would be ordinarily rendered or such persons
must be notified annually that a copy of such report will be sent on request. De-
tailed provisions concerning the auditing of the, ccounts of the bank in respect of a
common trust fund are found in the regulations.24
The settlement of such accounts is, of course, of equal if not greater importance,
but no attempt has been made by the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe what
method or procedure shall be followed. Apparently the Board recognized that the
law prevailing in the different states where such funds are established and the con-
ditions surrounding such funds are apt to vary so greatly that it would be unwise for
the Board to endeavor to regulate the settlement of such accounts. It should be
noted, however, that the regulations do require that the plan, pursuant to which any
such fund shall be established, must contain full and detailed provisions for "the
auditing and settlement of accounts of the bank with respect to the common trust
fund."25
This requirement is of importance. Great difficulty might develop if no method
or procedure be established for the settlement of such accounts. If such accounts be
not settled periodically, when the bank as trustee of any particular participating trust
is required to render, or voluntarily renders, an account of its proceedings in respect
of such trust, iindoubtedly it may be required to include therein a full statement of
its conduct of the common trust fund during the period such trust had a participation
therein, including the valuation thereof both at the time of admission and with-
drawal of such participation, and of all other participations in the intervening period.
If these common trust funds develop into substantial aggregations of capital, as it is
anticipated they will, the burden of defending the administration of the fund in
connection with the settlement of the accounts of the bank with respect to each
participating trust would be very great. If the bank had its common trust fund
accounts prepared periodically, and had many copies of these printed, it might be
possible for the bank to include these in accounts rendered by it with respect to the
participating trusts. But what of the expense and burden to a participating trust, of
having such accounts examined? Assume that the interested parties include a minor
for whom a guardian ad litem is appointed. The common trust fund might amount
to several million, and the participating interest of such a trust might be a few
hundred dollars. Such participating interest might have continued for ten or twenty
years. If the guardian should do all that would be required of him in examining
the accounts relating to the common trust fund during that period, the expense
would either be ruinous to the participating trust or the lack of provision for
adequate compensation would render the burden on the guardian intolerable.
It seems, therefore, that it is a practical necessity that some means should be
provided for the periodic and final settlement of the accounts of a bank relating to
a common trust fund, and that such settlement should be conclusive upon all parties
interested in the participating trusts.
"ld. §S17(c)(3). 'Id. §17(c)(1).
FEDERAL RESERVE REGuLATIONS OF COMMON TRusT FuNDs
Before discussing what provision should be made for the settlement of such
accounts, it is necessary to determine the source of the authority for the investment
of funds in the common trust. It is a general principle of equity that trust funds
should at all times be separately invested and never mingled with those of other
trusts. Authority to depart from this rule must be sought either in the instrument
establishing the trust or in a statute of the state, the laws of which control the admin-
istration of such trust. Instances of the latter may be found in the statutes of several
states authorizing the collective investment of trust funds in bonds and mortgages.
Recently New York extended this principle to permit the investment of trust funds
in common trust funds established by trust companies pursuant to the Banking Law
of that state.20 This enactment authorizes such investment of funds of trusts hereto-
fore created as well as those hereafter established.
It is obvious that the settlement of the accounts relating to such a statutory fund
should be prescribed by the statute providing for the establishment of such funds,
and that care must be taken in such a statute to see to it that the provisions for the
settlement of such accounts meet the constitutional requirements for due process of
law. The New York statute above mentioned provides for the annual judicial settle-
ment of the accounts of each bank operating a common trust fund. Provision is
made for the publication of notice and the appointment of two guardians ad litem,
one to represent income beneficiaries who are minors, incompetents, or absentees,
and the other to represent similar parties who are remaindermen.
Where investment in the common trust fund is confined to those trusts where
specific authority to so invest is conferred by the instrument establishing such trusts,
the plan, which should be incorporated by reference in such trust instruments, may
provide some practical and inexpensive method for the settlement of the accounts
relating to the common trust fund. In some of the plans for such funds which were
established before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued its
regulations, it was provided that an independent auditor should be appointed by
some one occupying a semi-public position such as the president of the Chamber of
Commerce, and that such auditor should have authority, on behalf of all persons
having any interest in the common trust fund, to settle the accounts of the trustee.
Provision was further made that in case of dispute between the auditor and the
trustee, such dispute should be settled by arbitration.
In providing that the plan pursuant to which such a fund is established, must
contain provisions for the settlement of the accounts of the bank administering such
a fund, it seems that the Federal Reserve Board had in mind provisions along the
lines of those above mentioned. It is believed that the inclusion in the plan of pro-
vision for settlement of accounts is essential, not only to comply with the federal
regulations, but to meet the practical necessities involved. When a statutory fund is
established, undoubtedly it will be sufficient to provide in the plan that the accounts
shall be settled in the manner provided in the statute.
" N. Y. BANKUNG LAw, §xoo-c.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
No attempt has been made to mention in detail all the provisions found in the
federal regulations. These are succinctly and clearly stated. The purpose of this
article has been to state the problems presented in the hope that this might help to
explain the purpose and emphasize the importance of some of the provisions found
in the regulations.
Before closing, mention should be made of the care taken by the Board, while
endeavoring to protect the use of such funds from abuse, to avoid inflicting a penalty
upon innocent persons interested in the participating trusts from a failure on the
part of the bank to observe all the provisions of such regulations. It will be recalled
that the exemption from corporate taxes is only extended by Section i69 of the
Revenue Act of 1936, to those funds which are maintained "in conformity with the
rules and regulations prevailing from time to time, of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.. .. " To provide against the disastrous result of such a
fund being subjected to corporate taxes because of the innocent failure of the
administering hank to observe one or more of these regulations, such regulations
conclude with the following:
No mistake made in good faith and in the exercise of due care in connection with the
administration of a common trust fund shall be deemed to be a violation of this regulation
if promptly after discovery of the mistake the bank takes whatever action may be prac-
ticable in the circumstances to remedy the mistake. 27
But this is not all. The Board has been careful to define the precise method by which
controlling facts are to be determined. The trust investment committee of the bank
is charged with the duty of determining these, and action taken pursuant to its
determination made in good faith, is a compliance with the regulations. For example,
such committee must determine whether a trust desiring to participate "was created
or is being used for bona fide fiduciary purposes"; whether the fund contains any
investments in which a trust so desiring to participate "might not lawfully be in-
vested"; the value of the investments, the common fund, and of participating interests
therein, as well as the proportion of such fund which consists of cash and readily
marketable securities.
In closing, the author desires to pay tribute to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and its technical staff for the care used to establish practical
regulations which should prevent abuses arising in the use of these funds, as well as
in framing those regulations so that they may be followed without difficulty, if
reasonable care be used by any bank in establishing such a fund.
"Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F, §17(c)(9).
